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Abstract—We study anonymization techniques for preserving privacy in the publication of microdata tables. Although existing
approaches based on generalization can provide enough protection for identities, anonymized tables always suffer from various
attribute disclosures because generalization is inefficient to protect sensitive values and the partition of equivalence groups is directly
shown to the adversary. Besides, the generalized table also suffers from serious information loss because the original Quasi-Identifier
(QI) values are hardly preserved and the protection against attribute disclosure often causes over-protection against identity disclosure.
To this end, we propose a novel technique, called mutual cover, to hinder the adversary from matching the combination of QI values in
microdata tables. The rationale is to replace the original QI values with random QI values according to some random output tables that
make similar tuples to cover for each other at the minimal cost. As a result, the mutual cover prevents identity disclosure and attribute
disclosure more effectively than generalization while retaining the distribution of original QI values as far as possible, and the
information utility hardly decreases when enhancing the protection for sensitive values. The effectiveness of mutual cover is verified
with extensive experiments.
Index Terms—Privacy-preserving data publishing, mutual cover, random output table, δ-probability.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, massive digital information of individualshas been collected by numerous organizations. The data
holders, also known as curators, use this data for data
mining and machine learning tasks, and at the same time,
they also exchange and publish microdata for further com-
prehensive and accurate research. However, the collection
or publication of microdata poses threats to the privacy of
individuals. Consequently, many anonymization techniques
are proposed to defend against various privacy disclosures
while maintaining information utility as far as possible.
Previous research can be classified into two categories:
centralized publication [1] and distributed collection [2]. In
the first scenario, it is usually assumed that the curator
is reliable, and the curator publishes microdata to third-
part recipients for research purposes. The microdata table is
anonymized before release to protect sensitive information.
However, in the second scenario, the curator is assumed
untrustable. Therefore, the secret information of individuals
is randomized before submitting to prevent the curator from
inferring the original information of individuals.
This paper interests in centralized publication. Typically,
the attributes in microdata table are divided into three
categories: (1) Explicit-Identifier, such as name and social
security number, which can uniquely or mostly identify the
record owner; (2) Quasi-Identifier (QI), such as age, gender,
and zip code, which can be used to re-identify the record
owner when taken together; and (3) Sensitive attribute, such
as salary and disease, which contains the confidential infor-
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mation of individuals. According to Sweeney [3], even with
all explicit-identifier attributes being removed, the identity
of record can be disclosed by matching the combination of
QI values (e.g., gender, date of birth, and zip code).
Generalization [4], [5], [6] is one of the most widely
applied privacy-preserving techniques. It transforms the
values on QI attributes into general forms, and the tu-
ples with equal generalized values constitute an equiva-
lence group, such that the records in the same equivalence
group are indistinguishable. k-Anonymity [3] ensures that
the probability of identity disclosure is at most 1/k. For
example, Figure 1(b) is a generalized table of Figure 1(a)
that complies with 2-anonymity, and the adversary has to
acquire at least two different tuples by matching the age
value of any person.
(a) Original table (b) 2-anonymity (c) 5-diversity
Fig. 1. Example of generalization.
1.1 Motivation
Although the generalization for k-anonymity provides
enough protection for identities, it suffers from severe
attribute disclosure [7]. For example, in Figure 1(b), the
sensitive values in the third equivalence group are both
pneumonia. Therefore, an adversary can infer the disease
value of Dave by matching his age without re-identifying
his exact record.
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2To prevent such disclosure, many effective principles
have been proposed, such as l-diversity [7] and t-closeness
[8]. These principles require that the sensitive values in
each QI group keep within certain ratios respectively. For
the sake of simplicity, we only discuss l-diversity as the
representative of protecting sensitive values in this paper,
and our method can be applied to other principles in a
similar way. The generalized table complies with l-diversity
if the proportion of each sensitive value inside the equiv-
alence group is no more than 1/l. For instance, Figure
1(c) gives the generalized version of Figure 1(a) complying
with 5-diversity. The adversary needs to obtain at least five
different sensitive values by matching the age value of any
individual.
However, there is still a potential threat when the parti-
tion of equivalence groups is directly shown to the adver-
sary. The sensitive values in matching equivalence groups
narrow down the scope of the inference of the adversary.
For example, when an adversary matches the QI value of
Dave in Figure 1(c), the adversary can infer that Dave is in
the second equivalence group and his disease value must
be one of pneumonia, gastritis, cancer, flu, and bronchitis.
In the worst case, the disease value of Dave is exposed if
the adversary has enough background knowledge to elimi-
nate all the values except pneumonia. Besides, the partition
of equivalence groups also increases the information loss
of anonymized table because the results of the query are
always matching equivalence groups rather than specific
matching tuples. For example, if we select the tuples whose
age value is more than 30 in Figure 1(c), both the equiva-
lence groups are considered as the results.
Moreover, despite protecting against both identity dis-
closure and attribute disclosure, the information loss of
generalized table satisfying l-diversity is not negligible.
On the one hand, generalized values are determined by
only the maximum and minimum QI values in equivalence
groups, resulting in that equivalence groups only preserve
the ranges of QI values and the number of records. Conse-
quently, the distribution of QI values is hardly maintained
so that the information utility is reduced significantly.
On the other hand, the level of the protection for iden-
tities is possible to be compelled to increase for meeting
the condition of l-diversity. For example, the generalized
table in Figure 1(c) must comply with at least 5-anonymity
for satisfying 5-diversity even if the demand for protecting
identities is not that high. The over-protection causes more
information loss because a larger equivalence group often
needs larger ranges of generalized values to cover the QI
values. For instance, the example in Figure 1(b) maintains
more detailed QI values than that in Figure 1(c). As a result,
to decrease the information loss, the protection for sensitive
values should not affect the protection for identities exces-
sively.
1.2 Contributions
In this work, we develop a novel technique, called mutual
cover, to impede the adversary from matching the combi-
nation of QI values while overcoming the above problems.
The key idea of our solution is to make similar tuples
to cover for each other by randomizing their QI values
according to some random output tables. The advantages
are as follows: (1) mutual cover provides great privacy
protection mainly because the anonymization process is not
visible for the adversary; (2) the anonymized table of the
mutual cover has remarkable information utility because the
result of a query is specific records rather than QI groups;
(3) mutual cover avoids the over-protection for identities
while protecting sensitive values; and (4) mutual cover has
excellent flexibility that can achieve various anonymization
results by controlling random output tables.
There are three main steps in mutual cover. First, it
partitions the tuples into QI groups via certain heuristics,
then similar records are assigned in one QI group. Second,
random output tables, which control the distribution of
random output values in each QI group, are calculated to
make similar tuples to cover for each other at the minimal
cost. Finally, mutual cover replaces the original QI values
with random QI values according to the random output
tables. For example, suppose that mutual cover assigns
the records in Figure 1(a) into the same QI group. Then,
mutual cover calculates a random output table for example
on age as shown in Figure 2. In the random output table,
rows correspond to records, and columns correspond to
the range of age. Every entry value denotes the probability
that the record carries the column value. For instance, we
can observe that Dean is covered with Daphne and Helen,
and his age outputs 28 with probability 0.320538 and 29
with probability 0.679462. Finally, mutual cover generates
random QI values according to the random output table to
replace the corresponding original QI values.
Note that, different from generalization, it is important
that the anonymization of mutual cover is a “black box”
process for recipients, and the anonymized table does not
contain the identifier of QI groups, such that the only
difference between the original table and the anonymized
table is some row QI values are replaced with random QI
values. The adversary cannot determine which QI values
are altered, causing that the bigger the adversary uses the
combination of QI values, the more error-prone it is, but
the adversary obtains much more matching records if the
size of the combination is not big enough. Besides, the
adversary is unable to obtain any QI group by matching the
combination of QI values, so that the partition of mutual
cover does not narrow down the scope of the inferential
sensitive values of the adversary. While for the recipient,
the results of query statements are specific records rather
than QI groups. Accordingly, the results are more accurate.
Additionally, different from traditional principles that
directly confine the values in microdata table, we propose
a δ-probability principle to control some particular random
output tables to limit the probability that any QI value
is used to re-identify a target person. Specifically, for any
record, any original QI value has at most probability δ to re-
identify the record owner. For example, the random output
table of Figure 2 complies with 12 -probability, and every
record is re-identified by the original QI value with at most
0.5 probability. Furthermore, mutual cover is extensible
that can achieve more anonymization results, such as k-
anonymity, by controlling particular random output tables.
Finally, we implement the mutual cover technique com-
plying with δ-probability principle and conduct extensive
3Fig. 2. The random output table for δ = 1
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experiments to evaluate the proposed algorithm. The ex-
periments illustrate four performances: (1) mutual cover
provides more effective protection against both identity
disclosure and attribute disclosure than generalization; (2)
mutual cover provides privacy preservation at much smaller
cost of information utility than generalization; (3) mutual
cover answers aggregate queries more accurately than gen-
eralization and bucketization; and (4) the protection against
attribute disclosure has little influence on the information
utility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 describes related studies. Section 3 proposes the formal-
ization of mutual cover and analyzes the property and
effect of related parameters. Section 4 presents the proposed
algorithm that implements mutual cover complying with
δ-probability. Section 5 shows the results and analysis of
experiments. Section 6 concludes the work and possible
directions for future studies.
2 RELATED WORK
The major research of privacy-preserving data publishing
focuses on preventing various disclosures and studying
the trade-off between privacy protection and information
preservation [1], [9], [10]. The generalization technique has
been well-studied by proposing numerous algorithms, di-
viding it into three schemes: global recoding [4], local recod-
ing [5], and multidimensional recoding [11]. However, gen-
eralization, which is proposed primarily to defend against
identity disclosure, is inefficient to protect sensitive values
and barely preserves the distribution of original QI values,
causing a huge cost of preventing the attribute disclosure.
Comparing to generalization, bucketization technique
[12], [13], [14] maintains excellent information utility due to
the preserving of all the original QI values. It partitions the
tuples into buckets in which each record corresponds to any
sensitive value with equal probability. However, most exist-
ing approaches cannot prevent the identity disclosure, and
the existence of individuals in the published table is likely
to be disclosed [15]. Furthermore, the QI values of individ-
uals can be easily exposed that increases the background
knowledge of adversary to learn the appearance pattern of
certain QI value and sensitive value in the released table
[16]. For these reasons, the application of bucketization is
always limited.
Differential privacy [17], [18], [19], which is proposed
for query-response systems, prevents the adversary from
inferring the presence or absence of any individual in the
database by adding random noise to aggregated results [20],
[21]. In recent years, local differential privacy [22], [23], [24]
has attracted increasing attention because it is particularly
useful in distributed environments where users submit their
sensitive information to untrusted curator. Randomized re-
sponse [25], [26], which is a client-based privacy solution, is
widely applied in local differential privacy to collect users’
statistics without violating the privacy. In the scenario of
centralized publication, the recipients including adversaries
can be considered as untrusted. Inspired by local differential
privacy, this paper uses the method of randomized response
to perturb the original QI values before release to prevent
the disclosure of matching the combination of QI values.
Specifically, mutual cover is enlightened by randomized
response technique that modifies the design matrix to the
random output table in which the probabilities of random
output QI values are calculated for records.
3 MUTUAL COVER TECHNIQUE
Suppose that a microdata table T consists of d QI attributes,
denoted as AQI1 , A
QI
2 , · · · , AQId , and a sensitive attribute,
denoted as ASA. Each attribute can be either categorical or
continuous, and D[A] represents the domain of attribute A.
Let AQIset denote the set of all the QI attributes. For any tuple
t ∈ T , t[A] represents t’s value on attribute A.
3.1 Formalization
The anonymization of mutual cover is to make similar
records to cover for each other, and mutual cover first needs
to partition the microdata table T into QI groups with
similar tuples.
Definition 1 (QI Group). A partition consists of several subsets
of T , such that each tuple belongs to exactly one subset, and each
subset is called a QI group. Specifically, let there be m QI groups
{G1, G2, · · · , Gm}, then
⋃m
i=1Gi = T , and for any 1 ≤ i1 6=
i2 ≤ m, Gi1 ∩Gi2 = ∅.
In addition, the partition has to follow certain principles
to protect sensitive values. If similar records in the same QI
group do not carry enough different sensitive values, their
sensitive values may be disclosed with high probability. We
introduce l-diverse partition to prevent the problem as far
as possible1.
Definition 2 (l-Diverse Partition). A partition is l-diverse, if
for each QI group, the proportion of each sensitive value is at most
1/l.
1. The partition can comply with other principle according to actual
demand, such as t-closeness.
4After dividing tuples into QI groups, the mutual cover
technique calculates random output tables in each QI group
and generates random QI values to replace the original QI
values according to the random output tables. The formal-
ization is as follows.
Definition 3 (Random Output Table). A random output table
contains the probabilities of how likely the records output corre-
sponding random values. Suppose that a QI group includes m
tuples {t1, t2, · · · , tm}, and the output values are represented as
{v1, v2, · · · , vn}. The random output table forms a m×n matrix p11 p12 · · · p1n... . . . ...
pm1 pm2 · · · pmn
 ,
where pij represents the probability that ti carries vj , such that
pij = Pr[v
i
output = vj |ti], i ∈ [1,m] and j ∈ [1, n],
where vioutput denotes the random output value for ti. Moreover,
we also have
pij ≥ 0, i ∈ [1,m] and j ∈ [1, n],
and
n∑
j=1
pij = 1, i ∈ [1,m],
such that each probability must be non-negative, and every record
can only carry a random value within {v1, v2, · · · , vn}.
Definition 4 (Mutual Cover Strategy). Given a partition of
T , the mutual cover strategy calculates the random output tables
for records in every QI group and generates random QI values
according to the random output tables.
Next, a principle called δ-probability is proposed to
control the probabilities in random output tables.
Definition 5 (δ-Probability). Given an anonymized table of
mutual cover, it complies with δ-probability, if all the random
output tables, which contain the distribution of probabilities on a
single QI attribute, satisfy the following equation:
max(pj)∑m
i=1 pij
≤ δ, j ∈ [1, n],
where max(pj) is the maximum probability in column j, m is
the number of records in QI group, and n is the size of output
values.
δ-Probability limits the probability that an adversary re-
identifies a target person by matching a single QI value
under a constant value of δ.
Example 1. Suppose that an adversary has known that the age
value of Dean is 29, and the anonymization process is hidden from
the adversary. Then, the adversary does not know the information
of the random output table including the range and probabilities
of the random output values of Dean. We calculate the probability
of re-identifying Dean by his age value in the anonymized table
as follows. According to Figure 2, there are three records, namely,
Daphne, Helen, and Dean may carry an age value of 29. Thus, the
calculation can be divided into four situations.
(1) If no one carries 29 in the anonymized table, the adversary
cannot re-identify Dean by his age value, and the probability is 0.
(2) If there is only one 29 in the released table, the probability
that Dean is re-identified is
Pr[vDaphne 6= 29, vHelen 6= 29, vDean = 29] ≈ 0.139.
(3) If there are two 29s in the anonymized table, the probability
that Dean carries 29 is
Pr[vDaphne 6= 29, vHelen = 29, vDean = 29]
+ Pr[vDaphne = 29, vHelen 6= 29, vDean = 29] ≈ 0.374.
Therefore, the adversary recognizes the record of Dean with
0.374/2 = 0.187 probability.
(4) If there are three 29s in the released table, Dean must carry
29, and the probability is
Pr[vDaphne = 29, vHelen = 29, vDean = 29] ≈ 0.165.
Then, the probability that Dean is re-identified by his age value is
0.165/3 ≈ 0.055.
Finally, the adversary re-identifies Dean by his age value with
0.139+0.187+0.055 = 0.381 probability. Thus, Dean maintains
his original QI value with high probability (i.e., 0.679462) but
being re-identified by matching his age value with low probability.
3.2 Analysis on parameter δ
The design of the random output table is the key element of
the mutual cover technique. Here we discuss the property
and effect of δ on the anonymized table complying with δ-
probability.
Property 1. Given an anonymized table of mutual cover comply-
ing with δ-probability, for any QI group, δ must be in the range
of [1/m, 1], where m is the number of tuples in the QI group.
Proof. According to Definition 5, for any column j in the
random output table including the distribution of probabil-
ities on a single QI attribute, we have
max(pj)∑m
i=1 pij
≤ δ,
where m is the number of tuples in the QI group. For any
column j, we have
max(pj) ≤
m∑
i=1
pij ≤ m ·max(pj).
Thus,
max(pj)
m ·max(pj) ≤
max(pj)∑m
i=1 pij
≤ max(pj)
max(pj)
,
then we have
1
m
≤ max(pj)∑m
i=1 pij
≤ 1.
Therefore, we conclude that
δ ≥ max(pj)∑m
i=1 pij
≥ 1
m
,
and δ does not affect the random output table when δ is
greater than 1, such that δ must be in the range of [1/m, 1].
Property 1 demonstrates the constraint that the range of
δ depends on the number of tuples in a specific QI group.
Next, the relation between the value of δ and the number of
5correlative tuples, given a released QI value, is discussed as
follows.
Corollary 1. Given an anonymized table of mutual cover com-
plying with δ-probability, each QI value in the released table
corresponds to at least d1/δe records.
Proof. According to Definition 5, for any column j in the
random output table including the distribution of probabil-
ities on a single QI attribute, we have
max(pj)∑m
i=1 pij
≤ δ,
where m is the number of tuples in the QI group. Thus, we
have
m∑
i=1
pij ≥ 1
δ
·max(pj).
For any QI value in the released table, the corresponding
column j in the random output table must have
max(pj) > 0.
According to Property 1, δ is within [1/m, 1]. Let k denote
b1/δc, then{
k ·max(pj) < 1δ ·max(pj) if b1/δc 6= d1/δe
k ·max(pj) = 1δ ·max(pj) if b1/δc = d1/δe
.
Therefore, we have{∑m
i=1 pij > k ·max(pj) if b1/δc 6= d1/δe∑m
i=1 pij ≥ k ·max(pj) if b1/δc = d1/δe
.
As a result, there are at least d1/δe probabilities greater than
0 in the column, such that each QI value in the released table
must correspond to at least d1/δe records.
For example, the random output table of Figure 2 com-
plies with 12 -probability, then each of the output values,
which may appear in the released table (i.e., the correspond-
ing column has at least one probability greater than 0),
corresponds to at least 2 records.
Note that, the function of δ is similar to that of pa-
rameter k in k-anonymity to some extent. Generalization
for k-anonymity requires that each generalized value in the
released table is carried by at least k records, and any record
carries each value in the range of generalized value with
equal probability. While in the mutual cover technique, par-
ticular random output tables can be calculated under certain
conditions to achieve the same result of k-anonymity except
showing the range of output values and the number of
correlative tuples in the released table2. The most important
difference between mutual cover and generalization is that
the anonymization unit of mutual cover is specific QI value
rather than record and we can control the anonymization re-
sult by assigning the distribution probabilities of QI values.
Thus, mutual cover is more flexible than generalization that
can achieve more anonymization results by controlling the
random output table.
2. For example, if we set all the entry values to 1/14 in Figure 2, any
tuple carries each age value with equal probability.
4 MUTUAL COVER ALGORITHM
This section presents an efficient algorithm to implement
the mutual cover framework. We aim to achieve three
goals. First, mutual cover satisfies δ-probability to hinder
the adversary from matching the combination of QI val-
ues. Second, the partition is l-diverse to protect sensitive
values. Note that, the partition can satisfy other principles
according to actual security requirement, e.g., t-closeness.
Third, the records cover for each other at the minimum cost,
i.e., maintaining original QI values as far as possible. The
procedure is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 MutualCover(T, δ, l)
1: Tanony = T
2: QI groups = ∅
3: partition table(Tanony, QI groups, l)
4: for each group ∈ QI groups do
5: for each attri ∈ AQIset do
6: random table = calculate table(group, attri, δ)
7: output values(group, attri, random table)
8: end for
9: randomize unchanged tuples(group)
10: end for
11: return Tanony
Tanony is initialized as T for storing the anonymized
result (line 1), and QI groups is initialized as an empty
set for storing the set of QI groups (line 2). Function
partition table(Tanony, QI groups, l) divides Tanony into
QI groups where each QI group is l-diverse and adds each
QI group into QI groups (line 3). At each iteration (lines 4
to 10), the algorithm calculates the random output table on
each QI attribute (line 6), and then replaces the original QI
values with random QI values according to random table
(line 7). Function randomize unchanged tuples(group)
randomly perturbs a QI value of each tuple whose
all QI values are originally preserved (line 9). Finally,
the algorithm returns Tanony as the result (line 11).
Note that, output values(group, attri, random table) and
randomize unchanged tuples(group) only replace the
original QI values with the corresponding random values
in Tanony , and the records in Tanony keep the same order.
Therefore, the partition and the random output tables are
hidden from the adversary.
Next, we elaborate partition table(T,QI groups, l),
calculate table(group, attri, δ), and randomize unchang-
ed tuples(group), respectively. There are many approaches
that divide the microdata table into QI groups, such as
[11], [13], and [27]. In this work, we modify Mondrian
[11] to achieve partition table(T,QI groups, l) as shown
in Algorithm 2. The other partition algorithms can also be
applied according to the actual demand.
The data structure temp QI set is initialized as the set
of all QI attributes (line 1). At each iteration (lines 2 to
14), the algorithm chooses an attribute from temp QI set
(line 3), counts its median value (line 4), then divides T
into two smaller parts (lines 5 and 6). The branch statement
(line 7) checks whether both the smaller parts Tsmall and
Tbig are l-diverse. If the condition is met, the algorithm re-
cursively calls partition table(Tsmall, QI groups, l) (line 8)
6Algorithm 2 partition table(T,QI groups, l)
1: temp QI set = AQIset
2: while temp QI set 6= ∅ do
3: attribute = choose attribute(T, temp QI set)
4: median = calculate median(T, attribute)
5: Tsmall = {t ∈ T : t[attribute] ≤ median}
6: Tbig = {t ∈ T : t[attribute] > median}
7: if check condition(Tsmall, Tbig, l) is True then
8: partition table(Tsmall, QI groups, l)
9: partition table(Tbig, QI groups, l)
10: break
11: else
12: temp QI set = temp QI set− attribute
13: end if
14: end while
15: if temp QI set = ∅ then
16: QI groups = QI groups+ T
17: end if
and partition table(Tbig, QI groups, l) (line 9). Otherwise,
the chosen attribute is eliminated from temp QI set (line
12). After the while loop, if temp QI set is empty, none
of the QI attributes can be used to divide T into smaller l-
diverse groups (line 15). Then, T is considered as a QI group
and being added into QI groups (line 16).
Then, we illustrate how to calculate the random output
table while retaining the original QI values as far as possible.
To measure the distance between two QI values, the distance
function is defined as follows:
Definition 6 (Distance Function). The distance function, de-
noted as dis(·), measures the distance between two values, such
that for any two values v1 and v2, dis(v1, v2) ∈ R+0 , where R+0
represents the region of non-negative real number.
Note that, it is hard to define the distance between QI
values on a categorical attribute. One feasible solution is
to build a customized hierarchy tree for each categorical
attribute and assign a specific distance value for each pair
of leaf nodes. While for continuous attribute, we implement
dis(·) by l1-distance, defined as follows:
Definition 7 (l1-Distance). Given two values v1 and v2, their
l1-distance is expressed as
||v1 − v2||1 = |v1 − v2|.
We transform the problem to a linear programming
model, and use the primal-dual path following algorithm
[28] to implement calculate table(group, attri, δ). Accord-
ing to Definition 3 and Definition 5, the linear programming
of calculate table(group, attri, δ) is given as
Min
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
dis(vorii , v
col
j )pij
s.t. 1)
n∑
j=1
pij = 1, i ∈ [1,m]
2)
max(pj)∑m
i=1 pij
≤ δ, j ∈ [1, n]
3) pij ≥ 0, i ∈ [1,m] and j ∈ [1, n]
where vorii is the original value of ti on attribute attri, v
col
j is
the value of column j, m is the number of records in group,
n is the size of domain within group on attribute attri. The
meaning of the objective function is to assign the probability
of each record to the output values (i.e., values within the
domain of attri inside group), and make the values, which
has a longer distance to the original value of the record,
carry lower probabilities on the premise of satisfying the
constraints.
In addition, according to Property 1, δ must be chosen
within a particular range depending on the size of QI
groups. Then, Algorithm 1 has the following property.
Property 2. In Algorithm 1, the condition in Property 1 is
satisfied when δ is within the range of [1/l, 1].
Proof. According to Algorithm 1, after dividing Tanony into
QI groups, each QI group is l-diverse, such that each QI
group includes at least l tuples. Therefore, δ can be set
within the range of [1/l, 1] to calculate the random output
tables in every QI group.
Finally, we describe randomize unchanged tuples(group)
in detail. The meaning of the function is to prevent the QI
values of some tuples be originally preserved, causing that
their identities may be disclosed with high probability. In
this paper, we perturb only a QI value for each unchanged
tuple, but the number of perturbed QI values can be set
according to the actual situation. Algorithm 3 gives the
pseudo-code of randomize unchanged tuples(group).
Algorithm 3 randomize unchanged tuples(group)
1: attribute weights = count weights(group)
2: unchanged tuples = pick unchanged(group)
3: for each tuple ∈ unchanged tuples do
4: while check unchanged(tuple) do
5: attri = choose attri(attribute weights)
6: replace QI value(tuple, attri, group)
7: end while
8: end for
9: return group
attribute weights stores the weight of each attribute
counted in group (line 1), and the weight is calcu-
lated by dismax(attri,group)dismax(attri,T ) , where dismax(attri, group) and
dismax(attri, T ) denote the max distance between val-
ues on attribute attri within group and T , respectively.
unchanged tuples denotes the set of tuples whose all
QI values are originally preserved in group (line 2). At
each iteration (lines 3 to 8), the algorithm chooses a tuple
from unchanged tuples, picks an attribute according to
attribute weights (line 5), and replaces an original QI value
with a random QI value from the range within group on
attribute attri (line 6) until at least one QI value is different
from the original value (line 4).
5 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section evaluates the effectiveness of the proposed
MutualCover algorithm. We use the real US Census data
[29], eliminate the tuples with missing values, and randomly
select 40,152 tuples with eight attributes. The QI attributes
7TABLE 1
Description of the attributes.
Attribute Type Size
1 Gender Categorical 2
2 Age Continuous 55
3 Relationship Categorical 13
4 Marital status Categorical 6
5 Race Categorical 9
6 Education Categorical 10
7 Hours per week Continuous 95
8 Salary Continuous 851
are gender, age, relationship, marital status, race, education,
and hours per week, and the sensitive attribute is salary.
Table 1 describes the attributes in details.
In the experiments, MutualCover complies with δ-
probability and the partition of QI groups is l-diverse. The
parameter δ is set at 15 ,
1
6 ,
1
7 ,
1
8 and
1
10 , respectively, and
l is assigned to 10. To reduce the accidental effect of ran-
domness, we run every experiment of MutualCover with
the same parameters for 10 times, and the max, min, and
average results are reported. Note that, since the mechanism
of mutual cover is different from that of generalization, the
experiments measure the effectiveness of protection via the
cost of the information utility, such that a better anonymiza-
tion algorithm achieves the same level of protection with a
smaller cost.
5.1 Privacy protection
This subsection conducts experiments to evaluate the pro-
tection of anonymized tables by MutualCover. We assume
that an adversary has all QI values of the target person, and
each QI value is combined to match the target person with
the probability of Pmatch. The experiments count the num-
ber of matching records for all the tuples in the anonymized
tables, and the average probabilities of identity disclosure
and attribute disclosure per tuple are calculated. The results
are as shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively.
Observing from Figure 3 and Figure 4, the identity
disclosure and attribute disclosure decrease with the re-
duction of δ because the released QI values correspond
to more records with smaller δ according to Corollary
1. Therefore, each record is covered with substantial
other records that dramatically reduces the probability of
being re-identified. Note that, since we apply function
randomize unchanged tuples(group) in Algorithm 1, the
lines in Figure 3(f) completely coincide on 0. Moreover, the
probability of disclosure increases when Pmatch raises from
0.3 to 0.7, the probabilities are very similar when Pmatch
are 0.7 and 0.8, respectively, and the probability starts to
reduce when Pmatch is greater than 0.8. Consequently, the
experiments demonstrate that the adversary can also be
confused even if he has known much information about the
target person. Note that, the adversary cannot determine
the optimal Pmatch in practice because the anonymization
process is completely hidden from the adversary.
Furthermore, we also implement Mondrian complying
with l-diversity for comparison. The probabilities of identity
disclosure and attribute disclosure are given as Figure 5(a)
and Figure 5(b), respectively. Note that, the probabilities
of identity disclosure are completely the same as that of
attribute disclosure because the level of protection for iden-
tities is compelled to be enhanced to that of sensitive values
for meeting the requirement of l-diversity. Additionally, the
anonymized tables by MutualCover provide better protec-
tion for identities and sensitive values than that of Mondrian
in most experiments and similar protection in the worst case
when the adversary chooses Pmatch between 0.7 and 0.8.
5.2 Information loss
This subsection measures the information loss of the
anonymized tables by MutualCover. ILoss [30] is a pop-
ular metric to estimate the information loss of generalized
value. We modify ILoss to count the information loss of
randomized value as follows:
ILoss(v) =
|v˜ − v|
|DA| ,
where v is the original QI value, v˜ is v’s random output
value, and |DA| is the size of attribute A containing v. The
overall information loss of the anonymized table T ′ is:
ILoss(T ′) =
∑
t∈T ′
∑
A∈AQIset
ILoss(t[A]).
The results of MutualCover are shown in Figure 6(a). In
addition, we also implement Mondrian complying with
l-diversity for comparison, and the results are shown in
Figure 6(b).
Observing from Figure 6(a), the information loss in-
creases with the decrease of parameter δ. According to
Corollary 1, each QI value in the released table corresponds
to more records with the reduction of δ, causing that
more records have to be involved for covering on the QI
values of long distance. Thus, the decrease of δ enhances
the protection but also increases the information loss. In
addition, comparing to Figure 6(b), both the information
loss and the interval of MutualCover are much less than
that of Mondrian. Therefore, the experiments illustrate that
comparing to generalization, the mutual cover provides
better protection (or even similar protection when Pmatch
is between 0.7 and 0.8) and enhances the protection at a
much smaller cost of information loss.
5.3 Query answering
In this subsection, we use the approach of aggregate query
answering [13] to check the information utility of the
anonymized tables by MutualCover. We randomly gen-
erate 1,000 queries and calculate the average relative error
rate for each anonymized table. The sequence of the query
is expressed in the following form:
SELECT SUM(salary) FROM Microdata
WHERE pred(A1) AND pred(A2) AND pred(A3) AND
pred(A4).
Specifically, the query condition contains four random QI
attributes, and the sum of salary is the result for comparison.
For categorical attributes, the predicate pred(A) has the
following form:
(A = v1 or A = v2 or · · · or A = vm),
8(a) Pmatch = 0.3 (b) Pmatch = 0.5 (c) Pmatch = 0.7
(d) Pmatch = 0.8 (e) Pmatch = 0.9 (f) Pmatch = 1
Fig. 3. Identity disclosure probability.
(a) Pmatch = 0.3 (b) Pmatch = 0.5 (c) Pmatch = 0.7
(d) Pmatch = 0.8 (e) Pmatch = 0.9 (f) Pmatch = 1
Fig. 4. Attribute disclosure probability.
where vi(1 ≤ i ≤ m) is a random value from D[A].
While for numerical attributes, the predicate pred(A) has
the following form:
(A > v) or (A < v) or (A = v) or
(A ≥ v) or (A ≤ v) or (A 6= v),
where v is a random value from D[A]. The relative error
rate, denoted as Rerror, is given by:
Rerror = (Sumupper − Sumlower)/Sumactual,
where Sumupper and Sumlower are upper bound and lower
bound of the sum of salary, respectively, and Sumactual is
the actual value. The results of MutualCover are given in
Figure 7(a). Moreover, we also perform the experiment on
Mondrian and Anatomy [12] complying with l-diversity for
comparison, and the results are shown in Figure 7(b) and
Figure 7(c), respectively.
We observe that the results of MutualCover are much
better than that of Mondrian and Anatomy. The primary rea-
son is that MutualCover does not preserve the QI groups
in the anonymized table and maintains a large majority of
9(a) Identity disclosure (b) Attribute disclosure
Fig. 5. Disclosure probability of Mondrian.
(a) MutualCover (b) Mondrian
Fig. 6. Information loss.
the original QI values. Consequently, the results of queries
are specific and accurate matching records rather than QI
groups, reducing much more error. In addition, the relative
error rate ofMutualCover fluctuates within a certain range,
so that δ has little influence on the query results.
5.4 Cost of attribute protection
The above-conducted experiments showed the results of
MutualCover when l is fixed at 10. In this subsection,
we evaluate the effect of l on information loss and query
answering to measure the influence of attribute protection.
We set l at 10, 12, 15, 18, and 20, respectively, assign δ to
1
6 , and use the same configuration as previous experiments.
The results are shown in Figure 8.
Results from Figure 8(a) and Figure 8(b) show that the
increase of l lowers the information loss but raises the rela-
tive error rate. It is because the number of tuples in each QI
group increases with the growth of l so that the probabilities
that tuples cover on the QI values of long distance re-
duce in random output tables, which decreases information
loss considerably. However, the probabilities that assign to
the QI values around the original QI value also increase,
which brings down the probability of original QI value,
causing that the accuracy of query answering decreases.
Note that, the experiments also reveal that enhancing the
level of attribute protection in mutual cover lowers much
information loss at only a little cost of the accuracy of query
answering. Therefore, comparing to Figure 6(b) and Figure
7(b), mutual cover avoids the problem of over-protection in
generalization.
6 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose a mutual cover technique for
privacy-preserving data publishing. The rationale is to make
similar records to cover for each other at the minimal cost by
perturbing the original QI values according to the random
output tables. The main advantages compared to gener-
alization are: (1) the anonymization process is completely
hidden from the adversary that provides more effective
protection; (2) mutual cover remedies the problem of over-
protection for identities; and (3) mutual cover preserves the
distribution of original QI values as far as possible. The
experiments illustrate that mutual cover provides impres-
sive privacy protection, little information loss, and accurate
query answering.
In future work, we will mainly research on applying
mutual cover in complicated scenarios, such as multiple re-
lease publication, continuous data publication, and person-
alized privacy preservation. At the same time, improving
the protection against various disclosures and optimizing
the anonymized result for maximizing information utility
simultaneously will be also studied.
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